

**Comprehensive report on the implementation of the pilot project
designated by the General Assembly in resolution 63/287
(A/66/755)**

**Statement to the Fifth Committee by the
Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services
Carman L. Lapointe
14 May 2012**

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Fifth Committee,

I am pleased to introduce the comprehensive report on the implementation of the pilot project designated by the General Assembly in resolution 63/287.

I am confident that this report provides an accurate and comprehensive review based on information currently available with regard to the decisions “to designate centers of investigation in Nairobi, Vienna and New York”, and “to maintain resident investigations staff presence in some peacekeeping operations, pending its consideration of the comprehensive report” on the pilot project.

Members may recall that the pilot project initiated at that time by the General Assembly in its resolution dated 30 June 2009, commenced on 1 July 2009 and was scheduled to continue for three years until 30 June 2012. While the criteria for measuring success of the pilot were not specified, OIOS could have easily inferred the objectives from the specific details requested for inclusion in the comprehensive report “with a view to deciding on a restructuring of the Investigations Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services”, including:

- Comments and observations of field missions;
- A complete qualitative analysis, including lessons learned;
- A clear and transparent presentation of the [then] existing structure and the pilot structure in terms of coverage of field missions;
- A cost-benefit analysis, including effectiveness and efficiency of the pilot structure, and assumptions, including of long-term trends of investigations in field missions;
- Justified rationale for all investigations staff and resources, and responsiveness to changing caseload requirements; and,

- Complete and updated information on current staffing, vacancy rates and caseload.

In short, the pilot obviously sought to answer the following question: “What is the most cost-effective structure that would enable OIOS to build and maintain adequate professional capacity to respond timely and effectively to the investigation needs within peacekeeping operations and in particular the express needs of field missions?”

Immediate action should have been taken by OIOS at that time on several fronts:

1. to establish clarity with regard to the intended purpose of the pilot;
2. to develop specific definitions for key elements of the question;
3. to determine the historical and actual baseline levels of services then being provided and benchmark against other relevant investigative bodies;
4. to systematically examine the strengths and weaknesses, if any (including root causes), of the existing structure from the perspectives of key stakeholders;
5. to establish reasonable future expectations of stakeholder clients as target objectives and outcomes;
6. to implement basic management monitoring mechanisms to measure and report on actual performance against targets; and,
7. propose adjustments to processes and/or structure to improve performance when needed.

Unfortunately, these actions were late getting started by almost a year and a half, and are challenging (if even possible) to establish long after-the-fact. Nevertheless, OIOS has developed and/or reconstructed a significant amount of data, where feasible, and is continuing to do so to improve future analysis.

In terms of client expectations, I especially would like to highlight that mission management has urged the building of investigative capacity in missions, mostly because on-site capacity is seen as more responsive and expertise is easily, and informally, available. Furthermore, it has become clear that, when investigators are embedded within a mission, more violations are reported. In fact, 26 per cent of peacekeeping-related reports during the pilot period were generated through on-site investigators.

Nonetheless, we found that, because of leave requirements, on-site investigators had slightly less available time to dedicate to investigations

than their counterparts in regional centres. And, unsurprisingly, the recruitment and retention of investigative staff continues to pose a challenge with an average vacancy rate of 44 per cent in the positions allocated to seven missions; and a vacancy rate of 30 per cent even in the centres. The temporary nature of the positions allocated to the pilot, and difficulties in attracting staff to non-family duty stations, increase the challenge when competition for professional investigative skills is fierce.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that, at this stage, we are able to draw general lessons and conclusions. Given the challenges and opportunities, including opportunities for travel-related savings with the establishment of an Investigations Office in the Regional Service Center in Entebbe, we believe that a hybrid structure would be the most useful approach for all concerned, for the Organization at-large, for OIOS, for peacekeeping missions, and in particular for the victims of certain types of misconduct such as sexual exploitation and abuse.

A slightly modified hybrid structure would allow retention of some centers, while increasing our support to mission management by building investigative capacity on the ground. We intend to submit a final analysis and proposals, including the impact on financial resources, in the context of the proposed support account budget for the period 2013/14, once full information on the results of the three-year pilot are available.

We believe this revised timeframe will permit completion of other key studies now ongoing in OIOS, and incorporation of relevant results, including an expert panel review of investigation processes, protocols, quality, efficiency and effectiveness, that might also impact structural and resource considerations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.